Abstract: Poorly governed (e.g., repressive) countries tend to be located near other poorly governed countries, and well governed countries near other well governed countries. The previous literature, by identifying country characteristics that influence government quality (e.g., ethnic fractionalization), provides one potential explanation: Neighboring countries tend to be similar with respect to those characteristics. In this paper, we provide a different, though complementary, explanation: The ability of a ruler to implement policy that displeases the country's populace is constrained by opportunities for residents to relocate to other countries nearby. To generate testable predictions about the effects of such "neighborhood constraints" on government quality, we develop a simple theoretical model. We test the model's predictions using cross-sectional and panel data, controlling for other determinants of government quality. The empirical results support the model's predictions.
The words are spoken by Apolloyon, ruler of the temporal "City of Destruction," to Christian, who 1 seeks to escape to the "Celestial City."
See, e.g., Barro (1997 Barro ( , 1999 , Easterly and Levine (1997) , Knack and Keefer (1995) , Londregan and 2 Poole (1996) , and Mauro (1995) .
For example, countries containing many ethnic groups may be more subject to internal conflict 3 , and countries nearer the equator may suffer because disease and unpleasant living conditions led to a legacy of poor institutions (e.g., Robinson 2001, 2002) .
1 "There is not a prince that will thus lightly lose his subjects." 
I. Introduction
It has been convincingly demonstrated that "good" political, legal, and social institutions (i.e., institutions that protect populations from the self-interested whims of rulers) are associated with substantially higher standards of living. Yet differences across countries in the quality of 2 institutions remains enormous. Why some governments treat their people relatively well while others are so repressive is thus one of the most important questions facing economists today. Recent studies have sought to explain the wide variation in government quality by relating measures of government quality to factors such as ethnic fractionalization, religion, and distance from the equator (e.g., Levine 1997, La Porta et al 1999; Alesina et al 2003) . The idea is that every country has an endowment of such factors (for historical or geographic reasons), and that the endowment influences how well the country is governed. 3 In this paper, we offer a different, though complementary, explanation: The ability of a ruler to run a "bad" (e.g., repressive) government is constrained by opportunities for citizens to relocate to other countries in close proximity. Given the assumption that rulers do not wish to lose their subjects (plausible in most circumstances, at least with respect to segments of the population), the possibility of citizen departures sets a lower bound on the depths to which a government will There were perhaps more than 1000 poleis in Classical Greece. For an economic analysis of the 4 rise of democracy in ancient Greece, see Fleck and Hanssen (2004) . 2 descend. How bad can a government can be? A country that is very difficult to leave can be governed very badly; however, a country with a well governed, easy to reach neighbor cannot be too poorly run without generating an exodus. In other words, a nation can be no worse than the best of the alternative countries, less an adjustment for the cost of getting there. We label this phenomenon "neighborhood constraints." The implication of neighborhood constraints is that nearby countries will tend to be alike in the quality of their governments, even in the absence of other similarities, unless substantial efforts are made to restrict people from moving.
Consider two stylized examples illustrating the neighborhood constraint phenomenon. First are the poleis (city-states) of ancient Greece. At a time when despotism and absolute rule were the norm in most advanced civilizations, an astonishing degree of democracy flourished in Greece -even the least democratic among the many poleis allowed far more public participation in policymaking than did anywhere else in the ancient world. It is not obvious what in the shared Greek religion, latitude, 4 or ethnic mix would have promoted such homogeneity, and indeed there is no generally accepted explanation for the rise of democracy in ancient Greece. What is clear, however, is that with all of the poleis located in close proximity, speaking the same language, and worshiping the same gods, a Greek citizen unhappy with the government of his polis could easily move to another. As a result, no single polis could be that much worse than the others without potentially losing a substantial portion of its citizenry. Therefore, once one Greek polis, for whatever reason, began providing its citizens with "good government," others had to follow.
At the other extreme, consider the former Soviet Bloc. At a time when democracy was flourishing in Western Europe, a deplorable degree of despotism and absolute rule prevailed to the Witness, for example, the number of "defections" even given the attempts to prevent emigration, 5 and the mass exodus from East Berlin before the building of the Berlin Wall.
Cuba, a former Soviet ally, is of course still communist and repressive; interestingly, however, in 6 Cuba's case, the major barrier to exit -the ocean -remains in place.
Note that our argument does not require that the destination country wish to receive immigrants 7 (many governments expend resources to prevent immigration), nor that it have any particular desire to improve the quality of the other country's government.
3 east. The countries in Eastern Europe differed little from their Western European neighbors in terms of shared history, culture, and geographic location, yet differed enormously in the responsiveness of their governments to their citizenries. Given the well-governed countries nearby (within walking distance in some cases), how was it possible for the nations of the East to sustain this repression for so many years? The reason, obviously, is that Eastern European countries expended enormous sums on preventing their people from leaving. Without such expenditure, Soviet Bloc governments simply could not have been so repressive -people would have departed in droves. Today, these countries 5 have largely abandoned efforts to prevent exit, and are significantly less repressive, as well. 6 The potential for nearby countries to constrain each other, by serving as potential destinations for aggrieved citizenries, is the focus of this paper. To investigate this phenomenon systematically, 7 we begin by constructing a simple theoretical model, in which each country has a representative citizen and a stylized ruler. The citizen's decision to stay in the country depends on the quality of government in that country, the quality of government in countries to which the citizen can move, and the cost of relocating to those countries. The ruler has a preferred level of government quality to provide to the citizen; this preferred level is exogenously determined. Regardless of the preferred level, however, the ruler will not set quality so low that the citizen leaves. The possibility of relocation thus sets a lower bound on government quality -a government will be no worse than the citizen's best alternative, adjusted for relocation costs. The model yields two econometrically See Section III, Appendix A, and Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of these variables. 8 4 testable predictions about expected government quality: (i) it increases as the quality of government in the best alternative destination rises, and (ii) it decreases as the cost of relocating to the best alternative destination rises.
We test the model with cross-sectional and panel data. Our focus is on how badly a government can get away with treating its citizenry. There are various forms such "badness" might take:
ignoring the public's preferences when setting policy, depriving citizens of civil rights, arbitrarily seizing people and property, and so forth. No single measure will capture all these dimensions, but the measures we have chosen reflect important aspects of them. In the cross-sectional analysis, we use three measures: (i) the Voice and Accountability indicator, developed by Kaufman, Zoido-Lobaton (2002a, 2002b) for the World Bank, (ii) the Political Rights index from the Freedom House (2002) , and (iii) the Civil Liberties index from the Freedom House (2002) . In the panel analysis, we use both of the Freedom House indices, which allow us to examine changes in government quality over a thirty year period.
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Identifying the appropriate measure of relocation costs is more challenging. Of greatest concern is the measure's exogeneity with respect to the policies implemented by the country's ruler. For reasons illustrated in the model, rulers who prefer to provide low levels of quality to their people may react by making departure difficult, as did the USSR. Thus, such seemingly obvious measures of relocation costs as visa requirements or the price of an airplane ticket are not appropriate for use in our econometric analysis. We focus instead on the effect that neighboring countries have on each other; a neighboring country is less costly to get to than a more distant country, all else equal.
Within the set of neighboring countries, our principal proxy for relocation costs is the length of the While border length may on occasion change as a result of government policy (see, e.g., Alesina   9 2003; Spolaore and Wacziarg 2003) , it is difficult to see how it would be related in any systematic way to the measures of government quality we analyze in this paper. Note that actual migration flows would not be a satisfactory proxy for relocation costs, because migration flows are endogenous -as the model will show, as a government gets worse, a citizen's incentive to depart increases, but so does the ruler's incentive to make such departures more costly. 5 shared border-the longer the shared border, the easier it generally is to enter a neighboring country.
In addition to the exogeneity of the measure to this application, an important advantage of the border length variable is that it is precisely measured and comparable across countries throughout the world and over time, in a way few other measures would be.
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The empirical results strongly support the model's predictions. In the cross-section, we find that government quality is positively related to that of the best alternative destination among the neighbors, and negatively related to our proxy for relocation costs. The results hold when we control for plausibly exogenous influences on government quality: ethnic fractionalization, linguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, the size of the Catholic population, the size of the Muslim population, and distance from the equator. We also control for GDP in the neighboring country, to capture economic influences on migration incentives. In the panel, including country fixed effects (thus controlling for any long-lived country-specific factors) and year dummies, we find that increases in government quality in the best alternative among neighboring countries are associated with increases in own government quality. In addition, regressing government quality on its past value and on past values of government quality in the best alternative destination, we find that countries located near substantially better governed alternatives -and thus for whom the neighborhood constraints should be most likely to bind -subsequently improve more than do other countries of similar quality. Finally, we find that the more that an alternative destination improves, the more the home country improves as well, controlling for previous home country government
The relationship between government quality and migration flows is complex. Although lower 10 government quality would, ceteris paribus, inspire more citizens to leave, our model predicts that very low levels of government quality can persist only where citizen's cannot easily leave for a better governed country (which, of course, means there will not be much migration). Indeed, the costs of leaving are themselves endogenous, because rulers of badly governed countries sometimes erect barriers to prevent emigration. Thus, to address these relationships in our empirical framework, we would need not only accurate data on migration flows between each pair of countries (such data are conspicuously lacking for poorly governed countries), but proxies for exogenous and endogenous (i.e., ruler-imposed) relocation costs. This, therefore, remains a topic for future research. 6 quality. In sum, neighborhood constraints appear to be empirically important determinants of government quality.
The model makes two additional predictions, neither of which can be easily tested econometrically with available data. First, a ruler who decides to maintain a very low level of government quality in the presence of a well governed neighbor will expend resources to prevent citizens from leaving. Second, neighborhood constraints lead to government quality that is higher on average across all countries than would otherwise be the case. We discuss these predictions in the context of several specific examples of good and bad government.
Before continuing, it is essential to make one thing clear: Neither our theory nor our empirical analysis seeks to explain actual migration flows. In order to investigate variations in government quality, we focus on the constraining effect of national governments on each other through potential (not actual) migration -indeed, in the theoretical model, no migration occurs in equilibrium. The effect of government quality on observed migration patterns is a fascinating question, but addressing it would require methods and data very different from those we use here.
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What our analysis does and does not say about migration -and about neighborhood constraints broadly -is perhaps best illustrated through an example: Mexico and the United States. The relationship between these two neighbors has three striking features: i) the United States is better governed than Mexico, ii) the United States attempts to restrict migration from Mexico, and iii) According to a recent article in The Economist (2005, 37) , Mexicans in the U.S. remit $14 billion 11 per year, which exceeds Mexico's revenue from the tourist industry.
Furthermore, a major reason the U.S. is the destination of choice for many Mexicans is that 12 incomes are higher in the U.S. Of course, higher incomes are to a large extent the result of better government. Thus, "economic migrants" are responding in part to the indirect effects of differences in government quality. Easterly and Levine (1997) , La Porta et al (1999) , and Alesina et al (2003) have shown that more 13 ethnically fragmented countries tend to have poorer quality institutions, ceteris paribus, presumably due to increased internal conflict. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) apply this argument to communities in the United States. Particular religions have also been hypothesized to affect the quality of government (e.g., Landes 1998; La Porta et al 1999) , as has nearness to the equator (e.g., La Porta et al 1999; Alesina et al 2003) . With respect to the latter, Robinson (2001, 2002) argue that in the parts of the world where European colonists suffered high rates of mortality several hundred years ago (i.e., tropical 7 Mexico does not discourage, and even receives benefits from, migration to the United States (remittances from Mexicans in the U.S. are substantial). None of these observations contradicts 11 the basic point of this analysis. First, although the United States is better governed than Mexico, both are better governed than average according to all three measures of quality we employ in this paper (see Appendix B). Second, nothing in our model or analysis requires the better-governed country to seek to improve the quality of its neighbor through accepting migrants -to the degree immigration is restricted, relocation costs are simply rendered higher. Third, although Mexico indeed benefits from the U.S. dollars that migrants send back to family members in Mexico, remittances to Mexico are conditional on the recipients remaining in Mexico. Thus, the Mexican government's support for (limited) migration does not signify that Mexico is free of the constraints that we describe.
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Although the fact that good government greatly improves economic well-being has been acknowledged at least since Adam Smith (1776), why some countries establish and maintain institutions that promote good government while others do not remains hotly debated. For the most part, the debate focuses on internal factors. Our contribution is to highlight the importance of a 13 locations), settlement was curtailed, and, therefore, so was the establishment of good political institutions. The bad institutions we see in place today are the descendants of those established back then. Also see Kiser and Barzel (1991) , Acemoglu and Robinson (2000 , Fleck and Hanssen (2004) , and Lizzeri and Persico (2004) for economic analyses of the expansion of the franchise, and Fleck (2000) and Falaschetti (2003) for discussions of why expanding the franchise may, depending on the circumstances, have both positive and negative effects on economic performance. But see Mukand and Rodrik (forthcoming) , who hypothesize that economic policy is affected by 14 informational externalities generated by policy experimentation in other countries. Some of the implications of their theory are similar to those we develop and test here.
Furthermore, compared to the widely studied case of individuals choosing between cities based on 15 the quality of local governments, the case of individuals choosing between countries involves relocation costs that are typically large and potentially a function of government policy. 8 heretofore largely unstudied influence on the quality of one's own government: the quality of one's neighbor's government. This is not to suggest that other factors do not matter as well -indeed, our 14 theoretical model incorporates cross-country heterogeneity in other determinants of government quality (although we make the simplifying assumption that these determinants are randomly distributed). A complete explanation of government quality clearly requires understanding those other determinants, too. Consequently, our theoretical explanation of government quality is only a partial one, and should be interpreted as complementary to the previous literature.
Finally, it is worth noting that the basic mechanism emphasized in this paper is similar to Tiebout (1956) competition. However, the reader should be aware that our application is very different from the typical Tiebout analysis. Our model is not one of heterogeneous citizens sorting themselves among alternative governments with alternative policy regimes. Instead, we focus on how the ability of citizens to exit will affect the extent to which rulers can govern in ways universally considered undesirable by their citizenries.
15
The value of D thus indicates the citizen's marginal rate of substitution between government quality 16 and relocation costs.
9

II. Theoretical Model
To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a simple theoretical model, in which we assume that each country consists of a representative citizen and a stylized ruler. We begin by listing our three key assumptions and deriving our main propositions. We then extend the model to consider endogenous relocation costs. The basic logic of the model is straightforward. Under Assumption A1, if the quality of one or more alternative country's government were to exceed the quality of a citizen's home country's government by more than the amount necessary to offset the cost of relocation, the citizen would relocate to a better governed country. Under Assumption A2, rulers set government quality at a 16 level at least high enough so that their citizens will not relocate. These assumptions, combined with the exogenous determinants of government quality in Assumption A3, yield three propositions. These three propositions provide a theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis to follow.
Proposition 1 shows that relocation costs determine whether neighborhood constraints operate.
When relocation costs are sufficiently high (r $ 1/D), there are no binding neighborhood constraints:
Observed government quality (Q) will depend solely on exogenous country characteristics (q) and, therefore, will not be related across countries. When relocation costs are lower, however, countries constrain each other with some positive probability. Thus, as Proposition 2 shows, neighborhood constraints cause government quality to be higher on average across all countries than would otherwise be the case; the lower the relocation costs, the higher the average quality. Finally, as Proposition 3 shows, if any of the alternative countries to which the citizen of the home country might relocate has a higher level of government quality than does the home country, the ruler of the home country cannot deviate downward from that quality by more than the citizen's cost of relocation.
Endogenous Relocation Costs
In the real world, regimes facing a situation analogous to a ruler facing a binding neighborhood constraint in our model may have a choice: Rather than improving the quality of government in order to induce their citizens to stay, rulers may make it more difficult for their citizens to leave (e.g.,
by stationing soldiers at the border, building a wall, punishing family members of "defectors," or not issuing passports). We will now extend the model in a simple manner to make the relocation costs faced by the citizen a function of the ruler's policy. In what follows, the ruler will again consider the citizen's incentives to leave when setting government quality, but now the ruler will also choose whether to incur a cost in order to raise the citizen's cost of relocating. We will model this as a decision to establish a "barrier to exit," making the following modifications to the original assumptions.
Assumption A1'. The citizen remains in the home country i if and only if: Thus, a ruler who would prefer a lower level of Q than otherwise possible will establish a barrier bi to exit if the cost of doing so (c ) is low enough relative to the quality reduction that the barrier allows. And only in the presence of a barrier can a large gap in Q between two countries exist if the exogenous between-country relocation cost is low.
III. Empirical Approach
The starting point for our empirical analysis is the model's characterization of the ruler of country i facing a constraint imposed by the combination of government quality in other countries ji jki k More formally, an RD for country i is a country j for which Q -Dr $ Q -Dr for all countries k 18 other than i. We use the term "reservation destination" to reflect opportunity cost in a manner analogous to a reservation wage for workers.
Appendix A lists definitions of variables and data sources. Appendix B provides descriptive 19 statistics and lists government quality scores for each country and its RD.
Kaufman, Kray, and Matsuzzi (2004, 3) write of the variable that it includes "a number of 20 indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. We also include in this category indicators measuring the independence of the media, which 12 and the cost of relocation to those countries. Recall that among those other countries j, the one with ji j the highest value of Q -Dr will be the best alternative country from the perspective of the home country's citizens. We will refer to this country as the home country's reservation destination, which we will denote throughout this paper as the RD.
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For testing the model, our regressions will all be variations of the following basic equation:
The dependent variable will be a proxy for the home country's government quality (Q). The two main explanatory variables will be proxies for the quality of government for the reservation RD RD destination (Q ), and the cost of relocating to the reservation destination (r ). X will consist of variables to control for other factors. The model predicts a positive coefficient on the reservation 1 destination's government quality (i.e., $ >0) and a negative coefficient on relocation costs (i.e., 2 $ <0).
Proxies for Q
We use three proxies for Q. The first is the Voice and Accountability indicator, developed by 19 Kaufman, Zoido-Lobaton (2002a, 2002b) for the World Bank. This variable provides a useful cross-sectional measure of an important aspect of government quality -the degree to which a government is accountable to its citizens. Presumably, the more accountable the government, the 20 also plays an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions."
The Freedom House website states, "Freedom is the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety 21 of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination. Freedom House measures freedom according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including through the right to vote, compete for public office, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state." See Freedom House (2002) .
This also reduces a potential problem with measurement error stemming from the discrete nature 22 of the Freedom House measures.
A longer border means more potential crossing points to a neighboring country, which in turn 23 makes it more difficult for the home country to block exit. It also makes it more difficult for the neighboring country to block entry, of relevance because well governed countries typically restrict immigration.
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greater the degree to which it acts in its citizens' interests. 
Proxies for r
In order to develop a measure of relocation costs, we do two things: First, we focus on neighboring countries. Second, we consider the length of the shared border between neighbors. In general, relocating to a neighboring country is less costly than relocating to a more distant country, and longer borders typically mean that it is easier to get to, and to get into, a neighboring country. We use relative border length (rather than miles of border) because the difference between a one-25 hundred-mile border and a two-hundred-mile border with a well governed neighbor is likely to matter substantially more for a small country (with a few hundred miles of borders in total) than for a large country (with thousands of miles of borders).
ij If q and q (the exogenous determinants of government quality) were truly drawn independently 26 in all cases (as in Assumption A3), we would have no need to control for country-specific factors. Controls ij i j are necessary, however, if q and q tend to have similar values when r is low; that is, if countries that have low relocation costs between them (neighbors, for example) also tend to be influenced by exogenous factors that would lead to similar levels of government quality in the absence of neighborhood constraints.
14 Pakistanis are reported to be paying $25,000, and Chinese $35,000, to be smuggled into the U.S.
24
The principal reason for the difference in price is, of course, that the latter countries do not share a ij border with the U.S. Our proxy for exogenous relocation costs, r , is therefore the length of the land border between neighboring countries i and j, divided by the total length of country i's land borders.
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Neighboring countries are obviously not the only alternative destinations; for example, the average citizen in a wealthy country can afford to pay for a flight to almost anywhere. Such costs are often prohibitive, however, for citizens in poorly governed countries, where migration is likely to be by land, perhaps even by foot. Therefore, we expect our focus on neighbors and our use of the border variable to represent relocation costs better for poorly governed countries, which are, in any case, where neighborhood constraints are most likely to bind. Furthermore, by focusing on neighbors, this analysis may capture other factors that affect relocation costs; for example, neighboring countries tend to be culturally similar (often sharing language and religion), which makes relocating to them easier, ceteris paribus.
Controlling for other factors
We control for a variety of factors that previous studies suggest may influence government quality. First, to control for the exogenous likelihood of internal conflict (which may, in turn, lead
26
See Alesina et al (2003) for a discussion of these variables and their effect on government quality.
27
See La Porta et al (1999) for a discussion of these variables and their effect on government quality.
28
See La Porta et al (1999) for a discussion of this variable and its effect on government quality.
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Of course, GDP will also reflect government quality. The availability of panel data from the Freedom House allows us to control for "other factors"
in a different manner. First, we will employ fixed effects to capture any country-specific factors that are invariant over time. Second, we will estimate a dynamic specification, in which we include lagged values of the quality measures, to explore more fully the nature of changes in government quality over time.
Identifying the Reservation Destination
To estimate Equation 1, we must define for each country in the data set another country as the RD (reservation destination). This presents an econometric challenge: We need estimated values 12 12 of $ and $ to define the set of RD's, yet we need the set of RD's in order to estimate $ and $ .
ik
Consequently, we use an iterative method. In the first iteration, we employ a simple rule (lowest r )
Note that our iterative method does not choose the set of RD's based on predictive power or 32 goodness of fit; doing so would be unjustified in terms of our theory and would obviously tend to generate spurious econometric results. Following the logic of our theoretical model, the results reported in the paper RD are based on a set of RD's determined by applying the iterative process to a simple regression of Q on Q RD and r . To test whether our conclusions are sensitive to the use of our iterative process, we experimented with alternative methods (e.g., including control variables in the iterations) and found results that were only trivially different (because we found a very similar set of RD's). we use to obtain second-round estimates of $ and $ . We repeat this process until it converges on a stable set of RD's.
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IV. Evidence
In this section, we estimate several variants of Equation 1, using the data described in the previous section. Two robustness tests are worth noting. First, we considered the effects of adding own-country GDP 34 as a control. Our results are insensitive to the inclusion of own-country GDP -see Appendix C. We added own-country GDP merely as a test of robustness because the variable is clearly endogenous -the quality of government has a causal effect on GDP (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999) . In principle, it would be interesting to instrument for GDP in order to estimate the effect of exogenous wealth on government quality, especially because greater citizen wealth will generally make it easier for citizens to emigrate. In practice, however, we have not attempted to do so. In the first place, it is far from clear that a reasonable set of instruments exists. Furthermore, solving the endogeneity problem is not critical because the coefficients of interest support our model's predictions regardless of whether own-country GDP is included.
Cross-sectional Results
RD
Second, we excluded the clearly unconstrained countries (i.e., those for which Q$Q ) from the analysis. Again, the results strongly support the model. In all six specifications reported in Table 1 and in RD Appendix C, the coefficients on Q increase substantially (to .62, .52, and .69 for the specifications in Table  1 , and to .52, .50, and .61 for the specifications in Appendix C) when we exclude the unconstrained RD countries. The t-statistics on Q also increase (to 4.82, 4.71, and 5.83 for the specifications in Table 1 , and RD to 4.34, 4.90 and 5.65 for the specifications in Appendix C). The coefficients and t-statistics on r remain very similar, with most increasing slightly relative to those reported in Table 1 and Appendix C.
Of course, a panel can only be meaningfully analyzed if government quality has changed over the 35 years covered by the data set. Although our theoretical model considers only a single period, the mechanism the model illustrates nonetheless applies if "shocks" (such as the death of a dictator, the overthrow of a good or bad regime, a natural or manmade disaster, or the end of foreign occupation) occasionally alter i government quality. This would be analogous to the model's original random assignment of q being repeated at intervals.
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RD RD model's prediction that a higher value of Q -Dr predicts a higher Q.
34
Panel Results
The panel regressions will make use of the two quality measures that are available for an The coefficient on border length is small and statistically insignificant in Regression 4. This is 36 unsurprising given the nature of the fixed effects regression: The set of RD's varies little from period to period, and the country dummies thus capture the effect of border length. Fixed effects would, of course, produce zero coefficients on border length if there were no cases in which a country's RD changed from one time period to the next. In short, the results from panel data support the model's predictions. Even when we include country fixed effects and year dummies in the estimation, or include the lagged dependent variable and year dummies, we find a positive relationship between the quality of government in a given country and that of its RD. Ceteris paribus, the better a home country's reservation destination is now, and the longer its border with it, the more likely is the home country to improve in the future.
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Furthermore, an improvement in the reservation destination increases the predicted improvement in the home country. Thus, the panel analysis provides evidence that our estimated effects of neighborhood constraints are not driven by the persistent influence of omitted historical and geographical factors.
V. Further Discussion of Relocation Costs
Although relocation costs play a central role in our theoretical model, there are important aspects of these costs that are extremely difficult to measure and, therefore, cannot be captured in our econometric analysis. We will therefore examine the model's predictions non-econometrically, to the degree we can. In this section, we do three things: (i) investigate whether the negative outliers in our econometric analysis are those countries that have barriers to exit, (ii) speculate on the empirical link between relocation costs and the average quality of government in a region, and (iii) review some anecdotal evidence on citizens' willingness to bear large costs in order to escape bad government.
Modern Outliers: Which Countries are Far Worse than Their Neighbors?
Suppose that a country is governed far more poorly than one or more of its neighbors. Drawing on our model, we would expect to observe either that (i) something is restricting the movement of the country's citizens or that (ii) the country will improve (as our panel analysis indicates does occur). To investigate this further, we identified the countries that, by all three measures of Q, ranked among the ten worse-than-predicted governments in our cross-sectional analysis; that is, countries governed far worse than their neighbors' government quality and the length of the shared border would predict. The four countries that made all three top-ten lists are Myanmar, North Korea, Bhutan, and Syria. With respect to three (Myanmar, North Korea, Syria), there is reason to believe our econometric proxy for exogenous relocation costs dramatically underestimates the true relocation costs; with respect to Bhutan, we predict improvement. We will mention one additional country because it provides an interesting comparison to Bhutan: Swaziland. Swaziland makes two of the top-ten worse-than-predicted lists: Voice and Accountability and Political
RD
Rights. In Bhutan, we predict improvement because r has fallen, while in Swaziland we predict RD improvement because Q has risen; Swaziland's neighbor, South Africa, has become much better governed since the fall of apartheid. Indeed, Swaziland's "benevolent" monarch has recently allowed some political reforms and steps toward greater democracy (e.g., CIA 2002).
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Indeed, the governments of both Myanmar and North Korea have established explicit barriers to prevent their citizens from leaving; Myanmar's military has even entered Thai territory to repatriate refugees at gunpoint, while North Korea is today's quintessential example of a walled-off country. In the case of Syria, the issue is not so much a barrier to exit, but rather the fact that Syria 39 is in a perpetual state of military conflict with its best-governed neighbor, Israel.
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The circumstances are different with respect to Bhutan. Bhutan is a monarchy, surrounded by the Himalayas, and was for centuries in self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world. Since the 1970s, the isolation has been slowly breaking down, which we would expect to reduce the costs of relocation and, thus, induce improvement. And, indeed, the government has recently expanded political rights to a modest degree.
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Do Low Values of r Lead to High Values of Q?
Proposition 2 predicts that the effect of neighborhood constraints will be higher average government quality everywhere than would otherwise be the case; the lower the relocation costs, the higher the average quality. The introduction to this paper discussed this basic idea with respect to
As explained in the introduction, Greek poleis all had exceptionally democratic governments, 42 particularly in comparison to the rest of the ancient world. If we take as exogenous the existence of many independently governed Greek cities within close proximity, our model predicts that the Greek cities would all be well governed from the perspective of the people who could easily migrate. To see why, consider two points. First, the large number of poleis increased the likelihood that at least some would establish governments better than those typical of the ancient world. The analogue of this in the theoretical model is straightforward: Having a greater number of countries leads to more draws of q and, hence, a higher expected value of the maximum q. Second, once those poleis with high values of q set high values of Q, the RD rest of the poleis were constrained away from low values of Q (because r was low). In fact, Greeks could and did move among the poleis. The larger poleis had substantial populations of foreign residents (metics), many of whom were from other Greek poleis. Furthermore, the establishment of colonies increased the number of potential destinations, and new colonies even recruited immigrants from other city-states (Freeman 1950, 25) . By contrast, an Egyptian unhappy with the Pharaoh's government could not as easily find a desirable alternative place to live.
See the discussions in Easterly and Levine (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 43 2002).
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ancient Greece. A similar phenomenon, working in the opposite direction, may help explain 42 modern day Africa. The lack of improvement in the institutions of most African countries, despite myriad policy proposals and decades of aid, remains a topic of intense interest. Africa suffers from 43 many problems, most of which are outside our model. Nonetheless, all else equal, our model would predict that government quality in Africa would be relatively low everywhere, for the simple reason that relocation costs are relatively large. In Africa, traveling from one country to another is often extremely difficult -many countries are spread over enormous territories with terrain that is famously challenging to cross (especially for people who lack the resources to travel by any means other than foot). Our model predicts that this would enable bad rulers to persist even in the presence of the occasional well governed country. By contrast, in ancient Greece, where relocation costs were low (reaching a neighboring city-state would seldom require traveling more than twenty miles or so), a single well governed city might have been enough to constrain the rest.
Willingness to Pay for Better Government: Evidence from Migration
In our model, the parameter D indicates the extra amount of government quality necessary to compensate the representative citizen for incurring a unit of relocation costs. In other words, 1/D is the willingness to pay for better government. For neighborhood constraints to bind in practice, this willingness to pay must be sufficiently high that people will indeed leave if their home country's government is bad enough. While we cannot estimate a meaningful counterpart to D using our empirical proxy for relocation costs, there is certainly evidence that the willingness to pay to escape terrible regimes is sizable. Note that the construction of the Berlin Wall, complete with machine gun nests, failed to stop escape attempts (hundreds of East Germans were killed at the wall). In Asia, hundreds of thousands of boat people have risked their lives on leaky boats in uncertain seas, and an uncounted number have drowned. In recent years, the press has reported the plight of North
Korean refugees in China, and their attempts to enter foreign embassies, at the risk of being arrested, repatriated, and charged with treason (e.g., Rosenthal 2002) . In short, where very bad governments persist without causing much emigration, the cost of relocating to a well governed country must be truly enormous (as our model would predict).
VI. Conclusion
By investigating the extent to which the quality of one country's government may depend on the quality of government in neighboring countries, this paper makes a new contribution to the understanding of the determinants of government quality. We develop a simple economic theory of neighborhood constraints -that is, how the ability of a ruler to implement policy that displeases the country's citizenry is constrained by opportunities for citizens to relocate to other countries. The empirical evidence -cross-sectional relationships, changes over time in panel data, and historical events including the rise of democracy in ancient Greece and the fall of the Soviet empire -supports the model's predictions.
Our findings raise interesting questions with respect to foreign policy. For example, there has been extensive discussion as to whether the establishment of a liberal democracy in the Arab Middle
East will spur democratic reforms in other Arab countries. The analysis presented here suggests a plausible rationale for why democracy might spread in this manner. But there is a caveat. In our model, rulers must care whether or not their people leave, and it is not clear that emigration is of critical concern to most Middle Eastern regimes, especially those whose wealth depends on oil deposits rather than on the human capital of their populations.
Appendix A Variables and Data Sources
Empirical Proxies for Q Voice & Accountability: A cross-sectional measure for each country. Directly from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002b) . ( 1972-73 to 1976-77, 1977-78 to 1981-82, . . ., 1997-98 to 2001-02 . The variables we use in our econometric analysis are actually 8 minus the Freedom House scores, and so run from 7 (best) to 1 (worst) rather than vice versa. (Abbreviated "POLRIGHTS" and "CIVLIB" in Appendix B.)
RD RD
Empirical Proxies for Q and r RD Q : For each country, the quality of government (measured by one of the three proxies described above) in the country's reservation destination (RD). The RD is determined using the iterative process described in Section III. In the panel analysis, the RD is determined separately for each year, then five-year averages are calculated. (Abbreviated "VOICE_RD," "POLRIGHTS_RD," and "CIVLIB_RD" in Appendix B.) RD Border : For each country i, the length of the border shared with its reservation destination (RD), divided by the total length of country i's borders. The RD is determined using the iterative process described in Section III. In the panel analysis, the RD is determined separately for each year, then 
Sample
All countries with a complete set of data are included. When countries split (e.g., the USSR, Yugoslavia) or merge (e.g., East Germany with West Germany), we count the new and old countries as different countries. 
Appendix B Descriptive Statistics and Government Quality Data
